Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate
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Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate. / Christiansen, Andreas.
In: Ethical Theory and Moral Practice, Vol. 20, No. 2, 2017, p. 239-255.Research output: Contribution to journal › Journal article › Research › peer-review
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TY - JOUR
T1 - Similarity Arguments in the Genetic Modification Debate
AU - Christiansen, Andreas
PY - 2017
Y1 - 2017
N2 - In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.
AB - In the ethical debate on genetic modification (GM), it is common to encounter the claim that some anti-GM argument would also apply an established, ethically accepted technology, and that the anti-GM argument is therefore unsuccessful. The paper discusses whether this argumentative strategy, the Similarity Argument, is sound. It presents a logically valid, generic form of the Similarity Argument and then shows that it is subject to three types of objection: (i) It does not respect the difference between pro tanto reasons and all-things-considered judgments; (ii) it relies on the unproblematic transferability of reasons from one case to another; and (iii) it runs the risk of equivocations, especially in cases where the anti-genetic-modification argument relies on gradable features. The paper then shows how these issues play out in three specific Similarity Arguments that can be found in the literature. Finally, the paper discusses what conclusions we can draw from the fact that genetic modification and established technologies are similar for the ethical status of genetic modification.
KW - Faculty of Humanities
KW - Genetic engineering
KW - Ethics
KW - Particularism
KW - Analogy
KW - Bioethics
KW - Environmental ethics
U2 - 10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y
DO - 10.1007/s10677-016-9757-y
M3 - Journal article
VL - 20
SP - 239
EP - 255
JO - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
JF - Ethical Theory and Moral Practice
SN - 1386-2820
IS - 2
ER -
ID: 170763047